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Commoditized Speech, “Bargain Fairness,” and The
First Amendment
Andrew Tutt∗
INTRODUCTION
Whatever else it is, speech is also frequently a commodity. Many
of the products and services people purchase also happen to be speech.
Books, magazines, movies, driving directions, relationship counseling,
financial advice, and bulk data do not begin to scratch the surface of
the examples one might give. Conversely, people also regularly pay for
silence. They purchase the right to have their secrets kept, their
confidences respected, and their reputations shielded. In commercial
settings, the government frequently intervenes to mandate disclosure
or decree silence—prohibiting materially misleading statements in
securities markets, requiring warning labels in product markets, and
prohibiting sexual harassment in the workplace.
What is particularly interesting about markets in products and
services that happen to be speech is that they blossom in the First
Amendment’s shadow. The Supreme Court once famously said
“[a]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content.” 1 Yet, to a notable extent, numerous laws
governing transactions in speech markets prohibit or require speech
on precisely those bases. Courts and scholars are still grasping for a
theory that safeguards important First Amendment values and makes
sense of the doctrine. 2 Some prominent scholars appear to believe that
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1. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
2. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1784–85 (2004) (explaining
that “however hard we try to theorize about the First Amendment’s boundaries, and however
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there is no general principle and that courts should work case by case
to weigh the First Amendment values at stake. 3
This Article makes the provocative claim that there is a general
principle governing the “commoditized speech” cases, one that
credibly safeguards First Amendment values and that judges can
manage. This Article terms that principle the “bargain fairness” model
of First Amendment review. The test is as follows: when economic
regulations equalize the relative bargaining power between parties
negotiating over products and services that also happen to be or
involve speech, the Court defers; when economic regulations have
other purposes, the Court intervenes. The fair bargain conception,
simple as it is, is highly consilient and explains a range of seemingly
unrelated First Amendment holdings. It explains why the Court
strikes down laws preventing people from purchasing movies,
videogames, books, and prescriber-identifying information, while also
explaining why the Court upholds laws permitting people to sue
promise-breaking newspapers, magazines that publish unauthorized
excerpts from forthcoming books, lawyers for malpractice, and
employers for sexual harassment. 4 It also helps explain the structure of
the murky law of unconstitutional conditions—why, in particular, a
public school teacher cannot be fired for publishing a letter to the
editor critical of the local schoolboard but a prosecutor can be fired
for circulating an office-wide questionnaire critical of management.5
Additionally, it helps explain why the courts permit greater speech
regulation in circumstances involving financial monopolies. In all of

successful such theorizing might be as a normative enterprise, efforts at anything close to an
explanation of the existing terrain of coverage and noncoverage are unavailing.”).
3. See, e.g., Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from
a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1251–82 (1983) (arguing
that the court employs an “eclectic” approach to First Amendment cases in which “a number of
variables interact in complex ways” and suggesting that this approach is normatively attractive).
4. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (striking down ban on
videogame sales); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (striking down ban on
purchase of prescriber-identifying information); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993)
(permitting hostile workplace sexual harassment claims); Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S.
663 (1991) (permitting promissory-estoppel suit against newspaper for failing to keep promise
to keep source’s identity confidential); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539 (1985) (permitting copyright infringement action against magazine publishing
unauthorized excerpts from forthcoming presidential memoir).
5. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (permitting firing for circulating
questionnaire); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (invalidating firing for
publishing letter to the editor).
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these circumstances, the Court applies bargain fairness review to the
laws at issue.
Beyond its explanatory power, there are reasons to regard the
bargain fairness model as a normatively adequate compromise
between competing approaches the Court might have taken to address
the relationship between the First Amendment and economic
regulation. First, the bargain fairness model is judicially manageable.
Judges engaged in First Amendment balancing in the commoditized
speech context try to figure out whether the regulation is designed to
ensure that the bargain between the parties is fair—that is, that the
regulation is designed to give a leg up to the less powerful or dominant
party. The fair bargain conception also opens space for speech
regulation in the commercial sphere that does not pose a significant
risk of spillover censorship—in other words, a risk of First Amendment
under-enforcement in non-commercial circumstances. Finally, because
speech regulations that enhance bargain fairness often resemble typical
regulations in other product and service markets, 6 they do not carry
the stigma of state-sponsored censorship even when, in practical
effect, they censor.
To be sure, there are problems with the fair bargain conception.
One might argue that permitting extensive regulation of speech
anywhere demeans speech everywhere, even in transactional settings.
And the fair bargain conception is circular to some degree. The value
of speech is influenced by judicial determinations about its value, and
thus the government can incrementally eliminate certain types of
speech from the marketplace by slowly paring it back in the interests
of fair bargains. But the normative problems with the fair bargain
conception are not insurmountable, and its incidental impacts on First
Amendment values are probably much smaller than its benefits to
public welfare. 7

6. For example, laws that protect workplace safety are similar to laws against sexual
harassment in the workplace; laws that prevent companies from disclaiming personal injury
liability for injuries arising from unsafe and defective products are similar to laws that prevent
professionals from disclaiming malpractice liability for failure to provide adequate professional
services. For more on the scope of First Amendment protections for professional speech, see
Claudia E. Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2017).
7. Cf. Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166,
2171–72 (2015) (explaining that “absent the distinction between high- and low-value speech,
it would be much more difficult for the government to justify its regulation of the commercial
marketplace, its ability to impose criminal sanctions on speech that facilitates or is otherwise
closely connected to criminal behavior or its efforts to maintain basic standards of public conduct
by prohibiting (for example) threatening and defamatory speech”).
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Two additional threshold questions are worth addressing at the
outset. First, a careful reader might question why this Article begins
from the premise that all content- and speaker-based regulations are
presumptively unconstitutional. Many First Amendment scholars
approach First Amendment questions from a different premise,
arguing that judicial protection for speech should only extend to types
of speech that have qualities that make speech special or important.
Second, careful readers might question whether the claims in this
Article are descriptive or normative or both. If the Article is meant to
be descriptive, they might also ask what kind of descriptive account
it offers.
To address the first question, this Article begins from the premise
that all content- and speaker-based regulations are presumptively
unconstitutional because that is the premise of the Supreme Court’s
doctrine. The Court recently reiterated its view, in Reed v. Town of
Gilbert, that “[c]ontent-based laws—those that target speech based
on its communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional,”
and that “laws favoring some speakers over others demand strict
scrutiny when the legislature’s speaker preference reflects a content
preference.” 8 The puzzle this Article seeks to solve is why a narrow
class of content- and speaker-based speech restrictions—namely, a
subset of laws regulating the market for commoditized speech—
escapes that searching scrutiny.
To be sure, many scholars approach First Amendment questions
in a different way. They begin with a grand theory that they use to
distinguish speech that should be judicially protected from speech that
should not be judicially protected. Robert Post, for example, has
argued that speech warrants protection to the degree it promotes
democratic legitimacy by permitting individuals to contribute to the
formation of public discourse. 9 For Post, and for scholars who
approach the First Amendment in a similar way, when the reasons for

8. 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226, 2230 (2015).
9. See Martin H. Redish & Abby Marie Mollen, Understanding Post’s and Meiklejohn’s
Mistakes: The Central Role of Adversary Democracy in the Theory of Free Expression, 103 NW. U.
L. REV. 1303, 1323 (2009) (“Post concludes that the purpose of the First Amendment is to
‘safeguard[] . . . public discourse from regulations that are inconsistent with democratic
legitimacy.’”) (quoting Robert C. Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2353, 2368 (2000)); see also Post, supra, at 2368 (“[T]he
participatory approach understands the First Amendment . . . as safeguarding the ability of
individual citizens to participate in the formation of public opinion.”).
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treating speech as special do not support protection for a certain class
or category of speech, it should not be protected. 10 This Article takes
a different approach because its claim is basically an exercise in
constructive interpretation. Its purpose is to take the Court’s doctrine
at face value but then to identify circumstances in which the Court
does not enforce that doctrine to the letter and discuss some possible
reasons why.
To address the second question, this Article is interpretive, and
therefore both descriptive and normative. It is descriptive in the sense
that it seeks to establish that the Court upholds laws that tend to
equalize bargaining power between parties to a transaction involving
commoditized speech. To be clear, this Article does not claim that the
Court explicitly applies a fair bargain test in its commoditized speech
cases. Rather, this Article offers an explanation and a justification for
the fact that the Court upholds laws that tend to equalize bargaining
power in spite of its formal doctrine, which seem to call for heightened
scrutiny in many such cases. This Article is normative in the sense that
it argues that the Court should formally adopt the bargain fairness
test. In support of that claim, the Article contends that the bargain
fairness test strikes a reasonable balance between free expression and
social welfare.
This Article has four parts. Part I discusses examples of the kinds
of laws that the government might impose involving commoditized
speech. Part II offers a more in-depth explanation of scholarly and
doctrinal confusion regarding the interaction between the First
Amendment and commoditized speech. Part III demonstrates how a
wide range of First Amendment issues are best understood as
concerned with ensuring bargain fairness. Part IV concludes with
thoughts on the normative issues involved in treating bargain fairness
as a preeminent value sufficient to permit extensive regulation of
speech in the commercial sphere.

10. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Viewpoint Discrimination and Commercial Speech, 41 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 169 (2007) (“Speech outside of public discourse, by contrast, does not merit these
[First Amendment] protections, because autonomy of speech in such contexts is not necessary
to ensure the democratic legitimation safeguarded by the First Amendment.”); Robert Post, The
Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2000) (arguing that the
subordinate status of commercial speech in First Amendment doctrine should be attributed to
the fact that it “consists of communication about commercial matters that conveys information
necessary for public decision making, but that does not itself form part of public discourse”).
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I. EXAMPLES OF ISSUES RAISED BY COMMODITIZED SPEECH
Commoditized speech is a category with a clear core and fuzzy
edges. As an initial matter, all speech that is bought and sold is subject
to some general market regulations, such as contract law, even when
the operation of that law results in the suppression of core protected
speech. 11 But some flavors of speech are even more commodity-like
than others. In general, archetypical commoditized speech is speech
that (1) is bought and sold in a commercial setting, (2) is sought (or
silenced) by a motive for private gain rather than a desire for social
change, (3) is not generally regarded as useful or harmful because of
its capacity to persuade individuals to alter their beliefs, (4) is
exchanged in a one-to-one manner, rather than broadcast in a one-tomany manner, and (5) is useful for accomplishing a narrow or
specific task. 12
Typical commoditized speech exhibits all of the factors above. For
example, software programs are sold in a commercial setting generally
out of a motive for private gain rather than social change, because of
their usefulness as tools for accomplishing specific tasks. In addition,
software programs are not usually intended to convey a political
message, nor generally valued because they do so. Thus, although
software programs meet the formal criteria for recognition as speech—
and indeed, videogames are protected speech 13—they are subject to
ubiquitous commercial regulation, just like other products. 14 Maps
and navigational charts are similar archetypical examples of
commoditized speech. 15 They are widely seen as consumer products,
valued for their practical benefits, not as speech.
Much speech exhibits some but not all of the indicia of
commoditization. It is with respect to this type of speech that
questions most frequently arise regarding the application of the First
Amendment to regulation of the speech at issue.
Consider social networking websites. Social networks are plainly
places where lots of core protected First Amendment activity takes

11. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 667–71 (1991).
12. Cf. Schauer, supra note 2, at 1800–07 (proposing similar factors as indicia of First
Amendment coverage generally).
13. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (“[V]ideo games
qualify for First Amendment protection.”).
14. See Andrew Tutt, Software Speech, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 73 (2012).
15. See Schauer, supra note 2, at 1802.
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place. Yet such networks frequently write contracts authorizing
themselves to collect, use, and share individuals’ personal information
in vague, ambiguous, and sweeping terms. 16 The social networks may
be using individuals’ personal information to improve their service, or
to sell it to advertisers, or both. Their contracts thus implicate a speech
commodity—an individual’s personal information—in circumstances
that intertwine its collection and use with protected First Amendment
speech. An open question is whether the government may regulate
that transaction—for example, by creating a default rule that, in
circumstances in which certain consumer personal data is collected,
such collection is presumptively unauthorized unless the terms and
conditions are set forth with precision. 17
Or consider internet mapping products and GPS devices. Such
devices provide people with useful information and therefore fall
within the First Amendment’s domain. 18 But individuals also
frequently rely on directions from mapping services and GPS devices
in real time (usually while driving). An open question is whether the
government may make it unlawful for services that provide driving
directions to disclaim personal injury liability when faulty directions
cause an accident.
Also consider search engines. As gatekeepers to the Internet,
search engines undoubtedly play one of the most significant and likely
protectable First Amendment roles in society. Many individuals are
unaware, however, that search engines do not promise that their
results are accurate, unbiased, or truthful. 19 Indeed, search engines
occasionally slant search results for commercial gain. An open
question is whether the government may mandate that search engines
periodically obtain acknowledgment from users that users are aware
that the results may be biased or inaccurate.
The purpose of this Article is to show that each of those
regulations would implicitly (and should explicitly) be analyzed under

16. See Andrew Tutt, The New Speech, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 235, 252–53 nn.46–
50 (2014) (cataloging Terms of Use policies offered by Google, Facebook, Wikipedia, and
others that permit those platforms to freely take and use user-data and user-generated content).
17. For a discussion of the state of academic legal scholarship addressing this question,
see Part II, infra.
18. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570–71 (2011).
19. Kristen Purcell, Joanna Brenner & Lee Rainie, Search Engine Use 2012: Main
Findings, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/03/09/mainfindings-11/.
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the bargain fairness test. That is, the question the Court should ask is
whether the purpose and effect of the regulation is to regulate the
fairness of the bargain between the consumer and the service or
product provider, and not for some other reason.
II. THE LITERATURE ON COMMODITIZED SPEECH 20
Debates about commercial speech are as fierce and fraught as ever.
But commercial speech, which the Court has emphasized is defined
narrowly to include only advertisements and proposals for commercial
transactions, 21 is a thin slice of the speech that people buy and sell
every day. To the degree law regulates speech in our society, contracts
play the largest role. In the workplace, employers use contracts to
impose limits on employee speech. 22 In planned communities,
residents use contracts to impose restrictions on how their neighbors
engage in speech on their property. 23 In the marketplace, customers
use contracts to control the speech of those with whom they do
business in countless scenarios. Everything from owning a credit card
to using an Internet service involves promises about how information
will be collected, shared, and used. Increasingly, individuals make
important choices on the basis of information furnished by thirdparties involving promises, implied or explicit, that the information is
accurate, unbiased, and truthful.
Scholars have long paid less attention to that other side of the
commercial speech equation, 24 what this Article has been calling
“commoditized speech.” For a long period, such speech was not
thought to warrant First Amendment attention at all. As Burt
Neuborne once explained, there was “a structural divide in first
amendment theory” that “provided effective protection to speech

20. For an extensive discussion of Supreme Court cases involving commoditized speech
and how the Court has decided them, see Part III, infra.
21. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 791–92
(1985) (explaining that the Court has “been extremely chary about extending the ‘commercial
speech’ doctrine beyond this narrowly circumscribed category of advertising”).
22. For a discussion of examples involving speech-restrictions in employment contracts
see Section III.A, infra.
23. Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1652 (2009).
24. See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 1212–16 (lamenting the lack of attention to “the
commercial speech that has been beneath the protection of the first amendment for all these
years [that] has not been confined to commercial advertising”).
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about religion, politics, science, and art, but no protection at all to
speech about consumer affairs, labor relations, or capital formation.” 25
That divide—what Frederick Schauer calls “boundary disputes” about
whether the First Amendment applies to a particular restriction on
speech—have been largely “invisible.” 26 As Schauer has explained,
there has been “[l]ittle case law and not much more commentary”
pertaining to “why the content-based restrictions of speech in the
Securities Act of 1933, the Sherman Antitrust Act, the National Labor
Relations Act, the Uniform Commercial Code, [and] the law of fraud”
(among others) do not raise First Amendment questions. 27
Literature devoted to the question of how the First Amendment
interacts with commoditized speech remains scattered and
underdeveloped. Many scholars have grappled with the question in
one fashion or another, but their efforts have only scratched the
surface. Their explanations have been incomplete, or their normative
prescriptions have called for radical shifts in existing doctrine, or
required the application of vague standards that offer little concrete
guidance. The following brief survey of the literature shows that the
area remains understudied and undertheorized.
In an important Article on this topic in the early 1980s, Steven
Shiffrin argued that the speech that gets itself involved in commerce
cannot be readily classified as protected or unprotected by easy
recourse to its status as commoditized speech because the category
designation is too broad. 28 Some people buy and sell speech precisely
because of its cultural and political importance, which might render
even neutral, generally applicable economic regulations suspect in
some cases. 29 Shiffrin suggests that hard cases might involve
commercial advertising that is critical of the government or that
advocates for the interests of corporations as social institutions; union
speech that addresses the fair distribution of power between workers

25. Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital
Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 5, 5 (1989).
26. Schauer, supra note 2, at 1768.
27. Id. at 1768.
28. See Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 1254–55.
29. See id. at 1283 (“Speech interacts with the rest of our reality in too many complicated
ways to allow the hope or the expectation that a single vision or a single theory could explain,
or dictate helpful conclusions in, the vast terrain of speech regulation. In trying to move toward
general theory, scholars have too often built abstractions without sufficient regard for the diverse
contexts in which speech regulation exists.”).
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and their employers; or a corporate proxy that recommends
divestment from unjust regimes or suggests that the company cannot
be run by a Republican board of directors. 30 Shiffrin contends that
many would regard it unacceptable for the government to regulate
those sorts of messages, even pursuant to neutral, generally applicable
laws against misleading, false, or fraudulent speech. 31 Shiffrin’s
broader point is that speech in any abstract category can warrant
First Amendment protection because its content can make
censorship indistinguishable from the kinds of censorship that
are clearly unacceptable. 32
Shiffrin’s argument is provocative, but it reflects a particular
conception of the role and purpose of the First Amendment. Namely,
he reasons that because particular applications of otherwise acceptable
prohibitions can lead to unsavory censorship, a better way of applying
the First Amendment is to pierce those rules when they have
objectionable consequences. 33 For example, in Shiffrin’s view, “the
SEC’s regulation of statements by corporate executives about a
corporation’s future” might warrant First Amendment protection—
even if placing restrictions on such statements is helpful for preventing
harm to investors—because such statements can be “of political
importance.” 34 That is a valid way to view how the First Amendment
should apply, but it is not the only way and it is inconsistent with how
the Court has conceptualized the Amendment.
Shiffrin’s understanding makes any law subject to searching First
Amendment scrutiny if the law, in one of its incidental applications,
imposes particularly unappealing censorship. 35 This position is not
without warrant and, after United States v. O’Brien, it is—at least
formally—the law. 36 But the Court has more often said that it can

30. See id. at 1231–32, 1242.
31. See id. at 1231–32 (“Even if one assumes that corporate elections are generally nonpolitical, the spectacle of the SEC editing proxy materials on the basis of what is true or false on
matters of domestic and foreign policy should at least cause first amendment eyebrows to lift.”).
32. See id. at 1256–82 (“[L]urking throughout first amendment doctrine are
renunciations of the equal value principle, and difficult compromises. What is important is that
the courts should be forced to face up to the significance of the compromises that they make.
At the same time, it is important to recognize that the compromises, while theoretically
significant, have been small compromises.”).
33. See id.
34. See id. at 1265–68.
35. See id. at 1251–54.
36. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
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almost automatically reject First Amendment claims, even claims
involving issues of paramount First Amendment moment, when, for
example, a law (1) is facially not concerned with speech, 37 or (2) is
content-neutral, even if the consequences are content-based. 38
The counterargument to Shiffrin’s contentions against categorywide exemptions is thus simply this: all rules are occasionally over- and
under-inclusive, because that is the nature of rules. But permitting
exceptions that transform rules into standards can so undermine their
purposes as to render them worthless. Treating certain regulations of
commoditized speech as categorically exempt from First Amendment
scrutiny may be necessary to make welfare-enhancing regulation of
the category possible at all.
Frederick Schauer, eschewing efforts to build a grand theory, has
analyzed the regulation of commoditized speech from what one might
call a sociological perspective. 39 That is, Schauer’s concern is not
whether commoditized speech should be subject to First Amendment
protection, but why it is not. 40 Schauer contends that commoditized
speech cases, like other cases at the “boundar[y]” of First Amendment
protection, cannot be explained by recourse to general principles.41
Building on the work of Kent Greenawalt, Schauer instead offers an
array of nondoctrinal “factors” that seem to function as “indicia of
coverage.” 42 Such factors include whether the speech (1) is “public
rather than face-to-face,” (2) is motivated by “desire for social change
rather than for private gain,” (3) “relates to something general rather
than to a specific transaction,” and (4) is “normative rather than
Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog that Didn’t Bark, 1994
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 15–16 (noting the conflict between O’Brien and RAV v. City of St. Paul); Jed
Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 770–72 (2001) (criticizing
O’Brien for permitting such claims).
37. That is the dictum of, among other cases, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
389 (1992) (explaining that “since words can in some circumstances violate laws directed not
against speech but against conduct (a law against treason, for example, is violated by telling the
enemy the Nation’s defense secrets), a particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable
class of speech can be swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct
rather than speech.”).
38. That is the holding of, among other cases, McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518,
2520 (2014) (“[A] facially neutral law does not become content based . . . simply because it may
disproportionately affect speech on certain topics.”).
39. Schauer, supra note 2, at 1787–88.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1786–87.
42. Id. at 1800–07.
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informational in content.” 43 Schauer further suggests that coverage is
influenced by (5) “the existence of a sympathetic litigant or class of
litigants,” (6) the “existence of a link with currently covered First
Amendment items or domains,” and (7) “the presence or absence of
an existing and well-entrenched regulatory scheme.” 44
Schauer’s indicia are useful, especially because they show that the
Court’s doctrinal statements are not as strong a predictor of outcomes
as the Court’s internal motivations. However, Schauer’s indicia also
suggest a pattern in the outcomes of the Court’s cases that can be
knitted together by a broader principle. Namely, many of Schauer’s
non-doctrinal indicia of First Amendment coverage neatly align with
the bargain fairness model this Article proposes. His indicia of what
kinds of speech generally fall outside First Amendment protection are
precisely the kinds of speech that are most often regulated because of
their commoditized nature rather than other purposes. In this sense,
Schauer has usefully identified a correlation between highly
commodity-like speech and lax First Amendment scrutiny; this Article
explains why that correlation exists.
Eugene Volokh has more recently suggested that the permissible
boundaries of commoditized speech regulation are in fact
exceptionally narrow. 45 In a larger article about why the government
may not broadly legislate informational privacy rules, Volokh asserts
that there is only “one sort of limited information privacy law—
contract law applied to promises not to reveal information—[that] is
eminently defensible under existing free speech doctrine.” 46 Volokh
takes the position that the government can create privacy-protective
contract default rules, but may not make those privacyprotections unwaivable. 47
Volokh’s effort is grounded in doctrine, namely, the textbook case
of Cohen v. Cowles Media, which held that a promissory estoppel action
may be brought against a newspaper to enforce a promise not to reveal
a source’s identity. 48 But Volokh does not root his defense of
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1061–
62 (2000).
46. Id. at 1057.
47. Id. at 1061–62.
48. See id. at 1057–62.
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contractual privacy defaults in a deeper normative theory of the First
Amendment, nor square it with the considerable body of doctrine that
permits the government to create basically unwaivable contractual
provisions not to speak. As Schauer explained, “[l]iability for
misleading instructions, maps, and formulas, for example, is generally
(and silently) understood not to raise First Amendment issues.”49
Similarly, prohibitions on workplace sexual harassment are not treated
as raising First Amendment concerns. 50 Thus, even as Volokh admits
there is a broad sphere of permissible regulation without First
Amendment review—regulation by contract default-rule—he does
not engage in a comprehensive review of the doctrine or the theory
supporting even stronger regulation.
Daniel Solove and Neil Richards have provided the most recent
thorough analysis of the First Amendment’s place in the regulation of
commoditized speech. 51 Solove and Richards are concerned not only
with transactional relationships, but also with the category of remedies
that the legal system makes available to individuals for privatelyinflicted speech harms (a category into which transactional
relationships happen to fall). 52 They offer a grand theory of the
appropriate role of the Court in policing such “civil” remedies: “that
the First Amendment should apply to civil liability when government
power shapes the content of public discourse, but not when
government power merely serves as a backstop to private ordering.”53
Solove and Richards come closest to proposing a theory that
reflects the bargain fairness model. If by “backstop to private
ordering” they mean those regulations concerned with enhancing
bargain fairness (a common form of market regulation), Solove and
Richards’ test would perfectly match the model suggested here. But
what Solove and Richards mean by “backstop to private ordering” is
both broader and narrower than the bargain fairness test. Solove and
49. Schauer, supra note 2, at 1802.
50. See Fallon, supra note 36, at 1–2; see also Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech
and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1793–98 (1992) (arguing that workplace
sexual harassment should be subject to First Amendment scrutiny).
51. Solove & Richards, supra note 23, at 1651–54.
52. Solove and Richards are concerned with “civil” remedies—which involve all suits
between private individuals, whether the individuals involved in the suits are strangers or
associates or are suing in tort or contract. Because suits between private parties involved in
consensual relationships are civil suits that give rise to civil remedies, they are a “subset” of the
types of relationships to which Solove and Richards are interested.
53. Id. at 1655.
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Richards explain that a law “shapes the content of public discourse”
(and therefore is not merely a “backstop to private ordering”) when
“(1) the government defines the content of the civil duty; and (2) the
speaker cannot avoid accepting the duty, or the government exercises
undue power in procuring the speaker’s acceptance.” 54 This test is thus
broader than the bargain fairness test because it would permit the
government to regulate with any interest in mind, and not merely to
protect the interests of one of the parties to a bargain. Solove and
Richards’ test is also narrower than the bargain fairness test because it
would prevent the government from creating unwaivable rules that
favor less powerful parties even though such rules are often found to
be, and should be, permissible when they promote bargain fairness.
Putting aside other ambiguities and complexities in Solove and
Richards’ test, their suggestion, in line with Volokh, 55 that the
question should be whether the government imposes a duty that
individuals can avoid, 56 is inconsistent with much existing First
Amendment doctrine (e.g., mandatory information privacy laws,
limits on harassing workplace speech, and limits on speech by public
employees). Moreover, it mistakenly focuses on an undertheorized
conception of individual autonomy at the expense of other values that
seem to animate decisions in this area (e.g., social welfare, fairness, and
concern for preserving robust and wide-open public debate).
This earlier scholarship thus charts a path forward, but remains
incomplete. Some scholars fail to fully appreciate that the Supreme
Court’s cases permit more extensive regulation of consensual
relationships than mere regulation by default rules. 57 Others believe
that no general principle can adequately account for the diversity of
outcomes that appear in the cases. 58 But there is a general principle at
play in the cases, and its gravitational pull is stronger than scholars
have recognized. 59 The regulation of commoditized speech can have
serious implications for public discourse, but this Article contends that
judges have accepted those costs as the price of transactional fairness
when speech is bought and sold. This Article aims to shake up the
scholarly debate by showing how the cases reflect a coherent and
54. Id. at 1655, 1692.
55. Solove and Richards offer little guidance as to when government duties are sufficiently
avoidable as to pose no First Amendment problem.
56. Id. at 1692–94.
57. See, e.g., id. at 1655; Volokh, supra note 45, at 1057.
58. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 2, at 1786–87; Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 1251–82.
59. For an in-depth discussion of the cases, see Part III, infra.
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III. BARGAIN FAIRNESS AND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
This Part will establish that the holdings of many cases from across
First Amendment law can be best understood and justified through
the principle of bargain fairness. In other words, across multiple
doctrinal areas, the cases converge on a simple idea: that individuals
should be freely able to enter into speech-regulating relationships and
to purchase speech commodities, but that government regulations
that make those bargains fairer are entitled to deference—even
if the duties are unwaivable, are content-based, or result in
significant censorship.
This Part analyzes several areas of First Amendment law beginning
with private and government contracts to show how concern for social
welfare and bargain fairness guides the Court’s decisions. It then
addresses cases involving restrictions on the making and purchasing of
speech commodities and explains why the Court emphatically strikes
down such restrictions when enhancing bargain-fairness is not their
purpose or effect. Next, it moves quickly through transactional
relationships, monopoly relationships, and workplace relationships to
further establish bargain fairness’s trans-substantive application.
Finally, it considers cases where there is considerable judicial and
scholarly disagreement about what the right outcomes should be, and
explains that the disputes center on how to measure fairness.
A. The Private Contract Baseline
Contract law provides a useful baseline for the bargain fairness
framework, both because of its outsized role in regulating speech in
society, and because contract is the one area of speech regulation
where there is general scholarly and judicial agreement about the First
Amendment’s scope. 60 Everyone agrees you can sell your right to
speak. 61 Both scholars with the most expansive libertarian conceptions

60. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints
on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 437–38 nn.305–06 (1999); Mark A.
Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48
DUKE L.J. 147, 230 (1998); Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the
Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1879, 1881–82 (2013).
61. Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83
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of the First Amendment and those who understand the Amendment’s
contours to be much narrower treat contract as a presumptively valid
means of selectively restricting and restraining speech. 62
The broad-based agreement that contracts impose permissible
limitations on speech derives in part from doctrine. A half-century
ago, the Supreme Court saw no First Amendment problem with
enforcing a union contract that would have otherwise been a textbook
First Amendment violation. In Black v. Cutter Laboratories, the
Supreme Court dismissed a wrongful termination case brought by an
employee fired for her membership in the Communist Party as
presenting “no substantial federal question.” 63 The Court determined
that the California courts had interpreted the employment contract’s
“just cause” termination provision to permit the firing. 64 The Supreme
Court thus dismissed the case because the decision rested on an
independent and adequate state law ground—California contract
law. 65 Justices Douglas, Warren, and Black thought failing to invalidate
such a contract “sanction[ed] a flagrant violation of the First
Amendment.” 66 The Court did not. 67 Almost a half century later, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed that doctrine in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,
the modern case that is now most frequently cited for the proposition
that private contracts do not trigger First Amendment scrutiny. 68

CORNELL L. REV. 261, 268 (1998) (“[P]arties are generally free . . . to commit to being silent
about almost anything.”).
62. Volokh, supra note 45, at 1051 (“While privacy protection secured by contract is
constitutionally sound, broader information privacy rules are not easily defensible under existing
free speech law.”); Solove, supra note 60, at 1880–82, 1894–1900. In fairness, there are a few
scholars who have argued for the import of First Amendment norms into, for example, the
private workplace, but courts have resolutely refrained from acting. See Julian N. Eule &
Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to the Private Sector: With Every Wish
There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1537, 1539 (1998).
63. 351 U.S. 292, 299–300 (1956).
64. Id. at 298–99. In passing on the plausibility of the California Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the provision, which permitted termination for “just cause,” the Cutter Court
noted that the contract had been expressly amended to permit firings on the basis of an
individual’s political beliefs. Id.
65. Id. at 299.
66. Id. at 304 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“We sanction a flagrant violation of the First
Amendment when we allow California, acting through her highest court, to sustain Mrs.
Walker’s discharge because of her belief.”).
67. Id. at 298–99.
68. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 45, at 1057 (“The Supreme Court explicitly held in
Cohen v. Cowles Media that contracts not to speak are enforceable with no First
Amendment problems.”).
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The doctrine on this question is watertight. In the employment
context, there does not appear to be a single speech-related
termination decision that has been held unenforceable on First
Amendment grounds, even where the decision was clearly unrelated
to the job and was motivated by ideological animus. As Charles Glick
explained in a Note in the Yale Law Journal, decrying that apparent
insensitivity to First Amendment norms:
Expressive activities leading to . . . reprisals [by employers] have
included advocating Communism, advocating homosexuality, filing
grievances charging wrongdoing by superiors, writing letters critical
of management to newspapers or government agencies, publishing
an “underground” company newsletter, voicing misgivings about
product safety, announcing intentions of attending law school at
night, writing a novel, counseling a fellow employee of her legal
rights against the employer, criticizing a superior, implying a racial
bias on the part of the employer, and advocating women’s rights. 69

None of those reprisals were found to transgress the First
Amendment because they were authorized by the employees’
employment contracts. 70 Without implicating the First Amendment,
employers have similarly maintained policies barring employees from
speaking about “objectionable or inflammatory” topics off the job,
engaging in adultery, smoking, and purchasing and using competitors’
products. 71 Contracts requiring that secrets be kept are also among the
most common and most important agreements individuals enter.72
They are as enforceable as other contracts, 73 and few have ever been
subjected to First Amendment scrutiny. 74
69. Note, Free Speech, the Private Employee, and State Constitutions, 91 YALE L.J. 522,
526–27 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
70. Id.
71. See James A. Sonne, Monitoring for Quality Assurance: Employer Regulation of OffDuty Behavior, 43 GA. L. REV. 133, 140–42 (2008).
72. Garfield, supra note 61, at 269–74.
73. See, e.g., United Egg Producers v. Standard Brands, Inc., 44 F.3d 940, 942–43 (11th
Cir. 1995) (holding that a settlement restricting disparaging advertising about the other party’s
product did not implicate the First Amendment); Wilco Elec. Sys., Inc. v. Davis, 543 A.2d 1202,
1204–05 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that a restrictive covenant giving one party the exclusive
right to provide television services to residents of a particular development did not implicate the
First Amendment); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41 cmt. d (AM.
LAW INST. 1995) (discussing general enforceable of contracts protecting trade secrets).
74. For one counterexample in which a court did apply First Amendment scrutiny, see
Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publ’ns, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1289, 1295–96 (D. Minn. 1990) aff’d and
remanded, 939 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1991). The case was affirmed on alternate grounds, limiting
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The widespread consensus that contract falls outside of the ambit
of the First Amendment is not simply a product of unquestioning
adherence to outdated doctrine. Mere convention could not sustain
such widespread consensus—particularly in an area of doctrine as
fragmented and complex as the First Amendment. Rather, the
agreement that contract is outside the First Amendment reflects
essential, albeit unspoken, assumptions about the importance of
autonomy and the role of contract in society. 75
Many scholars and courts reason that because the right to speak is
an incident of individual autonomy, people can sell it. 76 As attractive
as respect for individual autonomy may seem as a justification for
permitting individuals to sell their right to speak, social welfare—not
autonomy—is probably the primary reason that courts permit the
practice. 77 If contracts involving speech were unenforceable, many
the state action holding to the opinion of the district court. Even in situations involving contracts
with the government, which, as the next section details, are ordinarily subject to First
Amendment scrutiny, many courts have held that First Amendment rights may be waived, as
long as the waiver is in a freely negotiated contract. See, e.g., Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. Erie, 853
F.2d 1084, 1099 (3d Cir. 1988) (explaining that “we know of no doctrine, and [the plaintiff]
has directed us to no case law, providing a per se rule that constitutional claims, even first
amendment claims, may not be waived” by agreement); see also Lake James Cmty. Volunteer Fire
Dept., Inc. v. Burke Cty., 149 F.3d 277, 278 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding valid contractual waiver
of first amendment rights), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1106 (1999); Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885,
889–90 (9th Cir. 1993) (same); Paragould Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Paragould, 930 F.2d
1310, 1315 (8th Cir. 1991) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 963 (1991).
75. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 60, at 437–38 & nn.305–06 (explaining that respect for
autonomy grounds the Cohen rule); Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1281 (1998) (explaining that voluntariness is the foundation of the
Cohen rule); Solove & Richards, supra note 23, at 1690 (acknowledging that “consent is a key
component” of contract enforceability even if not “the governing concept”); Volokh, supra note
45, at 1057, 1061 (explaining the Cohen rule is about permitting individuals to alienate the right
to speak).
76. There is no a priori reason, however, that application of the First Amendment should
turn on whether an individual has volunteered to permit the state to censor him via a contract.
Many rights cannot be sold because we do not believe it is proper to elevate respect for a person’s
autonomy over his power to exercise the right at a later time. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin,
Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1865–67 (1987). One cannot sell his vote, for
example. Id. at 1868. He cannot “sell himself into slavery . . . take undue risks of becoming
penniless, or . . . sell a kidney.” Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111–12
(1972). Speech is in many ways precisely the kind of right that would be justifiably inalienable.
See id.; see also Radin, supra, at 1863–70. The external costs of permitting its alienation “do not
lend themselves to collective measurement which is acceptably objective and nonarbitrary.”
Calabresi & Melamed, supra, at 1111–12.
77. The term “social welfare” as it is used here means the overall collective well-being of
individuals in society. “Specifically, social welfare is postulated to be an increasing function of
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socially beneficial transactions would not take place because
individuals would have no means of enforcement. Once the Court
decided that speech could be bought and sold in the interests of social
welfare, it sowed the seeds of bargain fairness. Like all other bargains,
bargains involving speech raise content-based concerns that
individuals will harm themselves “through their own ill-considered or
disadvantageous promises.” 78 In other words, the very rationale for
permitting contracts involving speech—social welfare—invites
regulation in the interests of social welfare. 79
One need look no further than Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. to see
that fairness and welfare are primary reasons that the Court exempts
contracts involving speech from First Amendment scrutiny. 80 In
Cohen, a newspaper broke a promise to a source that it would preserve
his anonymity because the newspaper believed that the source’s
identity was itself newsworthy. 81 The source sued the newspaper for,
among other things, breach of a contract created by promissory
estoppel, a doctrine that permits the State to imply a contract when a
party relies on the promise of another to his detriment. 82 The Supreme
Court held that the First Amendment did not shield the newspaper
from liability for breaking its promise. 83
Cohen is the textbook example of the Court upholding a speechrestrictive law on the basis of bargain fairness. The newspaper in Cohen
was penalized for speaking truthfully on a matter of public concern—
that is, engaging in an activity at the heart of the First Amendment—
because it broke a promise when it did so. And the case is not about
individual autonomy and freedom to contract. The case, after all, did
individuals’ well-being and to depend on no other factors. It is also generally supposed that each
individual’s well-being affects social welfare in a symmetric manner, which is to say that the idea
of social welfare incorporates a basic notion of equal concern for all individuals.” Louis Kaplow
& Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 985–86 (2001); see also A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 869, 873 n.6 (1998) (“Social welfare is determined by the well-being of individuals.
Thus, social welfare generally rises if individuals’ well-being rises, and falls if individuals’ wellbeing falls.”).
78. Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763,
797 (1983).
79. See id. at 763–64 (explaining that many “paternalistic” limitations on the ability of
parties to bind themselves by contract are founded on concern for an “actor’s own welfare”).
80. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 667–71 (1991).
81. Id. at 665–67.
82. Id. at 666–67.
83. Id. at 671.

135

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2017

not even involve a bilateral contract, but a promissory estoppel claim.84
The rationale of the case was that Minnesota’s promissory estoppel
law was general in application and merely required “those making
promises to keep them.” 85 But notice that obligating a party to follow
through on its promises is not about the autonomy of the promisor to
freely enter into a contract alienating his rights. Rather, it is about
safeguarding the welfare of the promisee who relies on the promise to
his detriment. The rationale for crafting the contract exception to the
First Amendment in Cohen was explicitly driven by a concern for
bargain fairness.
The Court’s treatment of private contracts lays the groundwork
for its approach to other market regulations involving commoditized
speech. Because the primary reason for permitting contracts involving
commoditized speech is social welfare, concern for welfare guides the
Court’s approach in other areas as well.
B. The Government Contract Ceiling
If private contracts form the baseline of commoditized speech
regulations, contracts with the government form the ceiling. All such
contracts are subject to First Amendment scrutiny. 86 Government
contracts provide a view on bargain fairness from another vantage
point. Suits to invalidate conditions in government contracts place the
value of bargains and First Amendment rights in direct competition.
Such suits thus reveal how the Court conceptualizes the
interrelationship of bargaining and speech rights in a particularly
direct way. The Court’s cases upholding and invalidating contractual
conditions in government contracts on First Amendment grounds
demonstrate the same overarching concern for bargain fairness that
appears in other areas.

84. Id. at 665.
85. Id. at 671.
86. Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Pickering v. Board of Education in 1968, even
government contracts were thought to be outside the First Amendment’s scope. Before
Pickering, the law was thought to be reflected Justice Holmes’ famous admonition in McAuliffe
v. Mayor of New Bedford: “The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he
has no constitutional right to be a policeman,” ergo government contracts do not come within
the First Amendment’s scope. 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892). Pickering established, however, that in
determining the enforceability of a government contract, the courts have an obligation to weigh
the government’s interest as an employer against the employee’s interest as a citizen. Pickering
v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).

136

117

Commoditized Speech

The traditional scholarly and judicial explanation for the
distinction between government contracts and other contracts is that
scrutiny for such contracts is a special case of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. 87 Failing to subject government contracts to First
Amendment scrutiny poses a risk that the government might “strip
the citizen of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution . . . under
the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege
the state threatens to withhold.” 88 In other words, government
contracts are a convenient opportunity for the government to engage
in impermissible censorship, and so the Court watches carefully to
ensure that the government does not do so.
The theory that speech restrictions in government employment
contracts are struck down because they impose unconstitutional
conditions does not neatly match up with the doctrine the Supreme
Court has developed in practice. 89 The Court has fashioned two
proxies for determining whether the First Amendment protects a
government employee’s speech from punishment. First, the Court
asks whether the speech relates to a matter of public concern. 90
Second, the Court asks whether the speech restriction is related to the
duties of the job. 91 If the speech is about a matter of public concern
87. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Another View of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions
and Contract Theory, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 920–22 (2006).
88. Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 593–94 (1926).
89. For a general critique, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1476 (1989).
90. See, e.g., City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004) (explaining that “the
boundaries of the public concern test are not well defined”); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S.
378, 380–83 (1987); Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979)
(explaining that employees’ views expressed privately on publicly important matters are
protected); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 282 (1977)
(emphasizing that statements were made in a public forum); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,
598 (1972); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572.
91. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 87, at 941–46 (“[T]he germaneness standard requires
that any given right be purchased with a limited type of ‘currency’ bearing a logical relationship
to the right.”); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1350, 1374 (1984); Renée Lettow Lerner,
Unconstitutional Conditions, Germaneness, and Institutional Review Boards, 101 NW. U. L. REV.
775, 781–82 (2007); Sullivan, supra note 89, at 1456–76 (discussing the centrality of
germaneness in the unconstitutional conditions cases, and its weaknesses as an explanation of
what should make a condition unconstitutional). The court has at times treated that as a
threshold inquiry, and at other times treated it as a factor to be balanced against the importance
of the speech. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (treating germaneness as
a threshold inquiry); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (treating germaneness as a factor to
be balanced).
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and is not within the scope of the duties of the job, it is protected from
punishment. 92 But it is hard to believe that either the “public concern”
requirement or the “scope of duties” requirement meaningfully
accomplishes the task of preventing the government from using its
status as employer to silence its employees more than it should. 93
These government contracts cases are susceptible to a different
interpretation, however. Rather than thinking of judicial supervision
of government contracts as intending to prevent unjustified
censorship, one might think of such supervision as an effort to ensure
that bargains between the government and its employees are fair. That
is, if government employees are to be silenced, the Court watches
carefully to ensure that they are not required to give up more
than necessary.
This reconceptualization convincingly explains both the public
concern test and the scope-of-employment test. The two tests make a
great deal of sense if the Court is seeking to determine whether the
bargain was fair: public concern sifts for the value of the speech, and
scope-of-duties is used to detect defects in the bargaining process.
Together, they serve to determine the likelihood that the employee
willingly parted with her rights and the likelihood that the government
really needed her to do so.
The public concern test invoked in the government contract cases
is best understood as involving a tacit evaluation of the value of
speaking to the speaker. Hence the odd cases that hold that private

92. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143, 151–52 (1983).
93. The public concern requirement makes little sense from a rights perspective. If the
Court’s goal in scrutinizing government contracts were to protect freedom of speech as a right
to speak, its choice to only protect some speech, but not all, would make little sense. Moreover,
as applied, the Court has held that even speech expressed in private can constitute speech on a
matter of public concern. The Court has also held that speech with relatively little substantive
content and low social value is speech on a matter of public concern in some circumstances, and
that speech with more content and relatively high social value is not on a matter of public concern
in other circumstances. Compare Rankin, 483 U.S. at 380–83, with Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 414–
15. It is also unclear how the scope-of-duties test prevents the government from censoring
speech it does not like. Surrendering a right germane to the performance of a specific task might
make the government’s interest more legitimate, but it is still censorship. Moreover, as applied,
the scope-of-duties test is so broad that almost any restriction can be found to be within the
scope of an employee’s duties at a high enough level of generality. See, e.g., U.S. Civil Serv.
Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564–67 (1973). Finally, the scope-ofduties test has proven a poor method of smoking out pretext. See San Diego, 543 U.S. at 81,
84–85.
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comments to a superior, 94 the expression of a fleeting opinion about
the news in the office, 95 and comments on local education policy in a
local newspaper 96 are all speech on matters of public concern sufficient
to preclude adverse employment actions. 97 The unifying theme is that
employees would not have lightly permitted their employers to
demand that they give up the right to express those opinions.98
These cases also show that the scope-of-duties test is a method of
sifting for defects in the bargaining process. The scope-of-duties test,
as applied, is used to determine whether it is likely that the
government had a genuine job-related reason for imposing the
restriction in question. From a bargain fairness perspective, that
analysis is important because the baseline presumption is that
employers do not generally require individuals to give up more First
Amendment freedom than is necessary to perform a given job (since
they would have to pay their employees more if they did so). The
scope-of-duties test thus helps the Court determine whether the
restrictions are actually economically justified, or if, instead, the
government has used its relative bargaining power to extract an
unfair concession. 99
The government contracts cases thus reveal more of a narrow
concern for protecting individuals’ private welfare than a broad
concern with preventing the government from censoring speech that
is structurally important to democratic governance. The Court’s goal
seems to be to ensure that employees who choose to give up their
right to speak do so on terms that are fair to them, not to prevent the
government from tampering with the broader marketplace of ideas.
94. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 414.
95. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 380–83.
96. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
97. The teacher in Pickering who wrote her letter to the editor criticizing the school
board, the teacher in Givhan who voiced her concerns about racial discrimination in the school
privately to her principal, and the clerical employee in Rankin who rooted for the President’s
assassin in a remark to her coworker, each made statements that expressed their personal views
in circumstances outside their traditional job roles. See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 380–83; Givhan,
439 U.S. at 414; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
98. In contrast, in cases like Connick v. Myers, where the Court held that an assistant
district attorney’s questionnaire critical of management was not speech on a matter of public
concern, the Court might have concluded that speech critical of management was likely to be
valuable to the government to restrict. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
99. To give an example, if the government tried to require government employees to
never reveal information acquired on the job, the scope-of-duties test would help the court to
show why the condition was likely invalid as applied to a custodian but valid as applied to a spy.
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To be sure, the remedies employed in government contract cases
do not perfectly align with a bargain fairness approach. In the
government employment cases, the Court steps in to strike down
contract terms rather than carefully evaluating whether the employees
were adequately compensated for them. 100 If bargain fairness is truly
the touchstone, one might reasonably ask why the Court would not
instead analyze whether the bargain adequately compensated the
employee for alienating the right to speak. After all, if in principle one
would be willing to sell her silence to the government for an
appropriate price, the Court should look to the contract price—in
addition to the value of the speech and the nature of the job—to
determine whether the bargain was fair.
There are two answers to that argument, and both have interesting
implications beyond the government contracts setting. First, it is
plausible that the Court does not analyze price because the market
value of relinquished rights to speech cannot be easily priced. Speechrestrictive conditions outside the scope of one’s job duties are unlikely
to be salient to individuals negotiating government contracts, and
oftentimes will have no private-market analogs, making it difficult to
find a substitute employment contract against which to price the term.
As such, the Court may strike out such terms as a secondbest alternative.
Second, the Court may strike out terms because even if such terms
could be priced, it would not be administrable to continually
adjudicate claims that individuals were not paid enough for their
silence. Striking out terms sets the conditions for all negotiations
between the government and its employees, thus preventing strategic
behavior by both parties when dickering over terms. Making
government speech restrictions waivable, even in principle, might be
so likely to be abused that the Court thinks it better to take such terms
off the table.
Those two problems—difficulty pricing terms and difficulty
policing negotiations—reappear in other areas involving
commoditized speech. Where a government regulation simulates a
contract term for which people would negotiate but is difficult to price
and police, the Court has generally deferred when the government
makes the term unwaivable.

100. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 477–80 (1995)
(invalidating law banning honoraria for certain executive branch employees).
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C. Unconstitutional Commoditized Speech Restrictions
The Court’s cases striking down regulations involving
commoditized speech also reveal the power of the fair bargain
conception by negative inference. In numerous instances, commercial
regulations that are not confined to the amelioration of bargain
inequalities are struck down. 101 Thus, even as bargain fairness can make
it seem as if the Court is unduly lax in its analysis of the regulation of
commoditized speech, these cases stand as a reminder of the limited
scope and application of the bargain fairness test.

101. Some examples demonstrate the breadth of this principle. In the charitable solicitation
context, the Supreme Court has at least thrice struck down rules that would limit consensual
donations to some types of charities by limiting the amount that charities could spend on
fundraising. See Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 619–21
(2003) (explaining that in Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988),
Secretary of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984), and Village
of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980), “the Court
invalidated laws that prohibited charitable organizations or fundraisers from engaging in
charitable solicitation if they spent high percentages of donated funds on fundraising—whether
or not any fraudulent representations were made to potential donors” because such laws are not
narrowly tailored to combat fraud). In the context of licensing schemes governing the
distribution of commoditized speech, the Supreme Court has invalidated laws empowering
officials to grant (or deny) permission to distribute leaflets and erect newsracks on public
property where the schemes were not narrowly tailored to protect public welfare. See City of
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 769–72 (1988) (newsracks); Lovell v. City
of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450–51 (1938) (leaflets). The Supreme Court has also struck down
prohibitions on the distribution of anonymous election-related leaflets—justified by the need to
better inform voters about the source of campaign-related messages and prevent fraud—finding
the better-inform-voters rationale insufficient because anonymity is part of the message, and
finding the anti-fraud rationale insufficient because the law was overbroad and other antifraud
statutes already adequately guarded against fraud. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514
U.S. 334, 348–49 (1995). The Supreme Court has struck down right-of-reply laws—laws that
permit politicians criticized by newspapers to respond on the pages of the same newspaper. Those
laws, although justified as giving consumers greater access to information they may want, have
been invalidated at least in part on the grounds that permitting a right-of-reply fundamentally
alters the product being sold. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256–58 (1974)
(invalidating newspaper right-of-reply statute); cf. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 116–21 (1973) (plurality opinion) (holding broadcasters had right to refuse to sell
advertising time to political advertisers). The Supreme Court has also said, in dictum, that there
can be no legitimate “state interest in suppressing [the dissemination of books] . . . out of
solicitude for the sensibilities of readers.” Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991); cf. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S.
46, 55 (1988) (holding that outrageousness of the speech to some readers did not alter its
protected status); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 116 (1943) (explaining in dictum
that Jehovah’s Witnesses could not be barred from engaging in door-to-door soliciting merely
because those views are “unpopular, annoying or distasteful” to some).
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Two recent cases provide ready examples. Sorrell v. IMS Health
Inc. and Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association both involved
government regulation of commercial transactions in which speech
commodities were sold. In each case the Court applied strict scrutiny
and struck down the regulations. 102 Each case involved regulation of
commoditized speech that did not seek to enhance the fairness of the
bargain between the parties to the transaction. The two cases thus
support the general thesis by negative implication: when
commoditized speech regulations do not seek to make a transaction
fairer to one of the parties to that transaction, but instead have other
purposes, the Court will strike them down.
In the first case, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., the Supreme Court
struck down a Vermont privacy law that prohibited the sale, disclosure
for marketing purposes, or use for marketing purposes of pharmacy
records that revealed the prescribing practices of individual doctors. 103
The Court treated the law as a content-based and speaker-based
restriction on speech, applied strict scrutiny, and invalidated it. 104
Lacking a better vocabulary for formulating their defense of the law,
Vermont tried to argue that the restrictions at issue should have been
subjected to more lenient scrutiny because the speech at issue was
“commercial speech.” 105 The Court held that even analyzed under the
more forgiving standards applicable to commercial speech, Vermont’s
law was unconstitutional. 106
In the second case, Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, the
Supreme Court struck down a California law that prohibited the sale
or rental of violent videogames to minors and required packaging
labels for such products to state “18.” 107 Like Vermont in Sorrell,
California lacked a ready vocabulary for arguing its case, but tried to
argue that the restrictions were permissible because violent speech is
like obscenity and unprotected by the First Amendment. 108 The Court
held that violent speech was entitled to full constitutional protection,

102. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011); Sorrell v. IMS Health
Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 565 (2011).
103. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 552, 556–57.
104. Id. at 565–67.
105. Id. at 571.
106. Id.
107. Brown, 564 U.S. at 789.
108. Id. at 792–93.
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determined that California’s law imposed a content-based restriction,
applied strict scrutiny, and invalidated the law. 109
The two cases look like straightforward applications of the content
principle and settled First Amendment norms. Neither was, however.
Both cases divided the court. Sorrell was 6–3, 110 and Brown was 7–2
with a two-justice concurrence. 111 Both cases masked deeper issues. In
Sorrell, the deeper issue was the extent to which the government may
protect a third-party’s interests (such as those of patients and doctors)
by interfering with otherwise consensual commercial transactions
between other parties (pharmacies and marketers). In Brown, the
deeper issue was the extent to which the government may interfere
with commercial transactions between two otherwise consenting
parties (children and videogame retailers).
Both cases clearly involve the regulation of commoditized speech
and paternalistic rather than more nefariously censorial government
motives. And in both cases, the laws at issue were found to violate the
First Amendment. These cases show that there is a range of
circumstances where the Court will intervene to strike down
regulations governing bargains over commoditized speech when those
regulations venture beyond ensuring bargain fairness. The crucial fact
about each case is that no party to the bargains wanted the transaction
to include the mandatory government term. In Brown, neither the
retailers nor the children wanted the transaction restricted. 112 In
Sorrell, neither the pharmacies nor the marketers wanted it. 113 The
regulations thus did not make the bargains fairer. They did not seek
to fill in a term that the less powerful party would have wanted had
the circumstances of bargaining been more equal. The Court struck
down the regulations in both cases because the laws at issue did not
seek to make a transaction fairer to one of the parties to that
transaction, but instead had other purposes.

109. Id. at 798–804.
110. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 555.
111. Brown, 564 U.S. at 787.
112. In Brown the restriction completely barred willing children from purchasing violent
videogames from willing retailers. There was no question that some children wished to purchase
the games on their own. See, e.g., id. at 794–95, 802–04 (discussing the law’s restrictions on
purchase even by children of parents who do not disapprove of the purchase).
113. IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 273 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The statute prevents
willing sellers and willing buyers from completing a sale of information to be used for purposes
that the state disapproves.”), aff’d, 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
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Take Sorrell: the Vermont law at issue made it unlawful for
pharmacies and marketers to engage in a consensual transaction.114
The law’s intent was not to protect the fairness of the bargain between
the pharmacies and advertisers. 115 Rather the statute imposed that bar
to protect the interests of third parties (patients, doctors, and the
general public). 116 The State contended that the law was “necessary to
protect medical privacy, including physician confidentiality, avoidance
of harassment, and the integrity of the doctor-patient relationship”
and was integral “to . . . improved public health and reduced
healthcare costs.” 117 The regulation in Sorrell thus prohibited an
otherwise consensual speech contract between A and B, in order to
protect the interests of C, D, and E. The Court rejected all of
Vermont’s proffered interests as insufficient to support the law even
under the relatively deferential standard afforded to commercial
speech. 118 Cryptically, near the end of the opinion, the Court noted
that its cases recognize that the government has a “legitimate interest
in protecting consumers from ‘commercial harms,’” but that Vermont
had not advanced a justification addressing harms of that type. 119
Similarly, in Brown, the California law prohibited the sale of
violent videogames to children on the grounds that children are
especially vulnerable to the effects of violent speech. 120 California did
not seek to hide this justification for the law. On the contrary,
California’s whole case was that the speech was unprotected (of low
value because it is immoral) and that children could be legitimately
prohibited from accessing it (because they are particularly vulnerable
to its corrupting influence). 121 California’s only other justification for
the law was that the law would help vindicate the third-party interests
of parents who wished to protect their children from video game
violence. 122 The Court rejected all of those justifications as not
presenting a compelling government interest sufficient to survive
strict scrutiny. 123

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

144

See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 558–59 (describing the law at issue).
See id. at 571–79 (describing Vermont’s asserted interests in enacting the law).
See id.
Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 572.
Id. at 572–79.
Id. at 579.
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 798–800 (2011).
Id. at 793–96, 800.
Id. at 801–04.
See id. at 794–96, 799–804.
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Suppose the facts of the two cases were modified slightly such that
the regulations were designed to enhance bargain fairness. It is
probable that the cases would have come out differently. Suppose, on
the one hand, that in Brown the software at issue were an automated
stock-trading program, and the requirement was a warning on the box
that the program’s trading algorithm had not been proven to actually
make any money. Those facts would make the case like Commodity
Futures Trading Commission v. Vartuli, a case in which the Second
Circuit held that the marketing, sale, and use of a stock trading
program was subject to the registration and antifraud provisions of the
securities laws and not protected by the First Amendment. 124 Unlike
the restrictions in Brown, the registration and antifraud laws upheld in
Vartuli exist to enhance bargain fairness by providing investors with
information they would surely want.
Suppose, on the other hand, that in Sorrell the prohibition had
“allow[ed] the [prescriber-identifying] information’s sale or disclosure
in only a few narrow and well-justified circumstances.” 125 There is
language in Sorrell that suggests that such a restriction would have
been constitutional because it would have shown that the “State’s
asserted interest in physician confidentiality” was actual, rather than
pre-textual. 126 Rather than an apparent concern with preventing the
commercial marketing of prescription drugs, that justification—
protecting physician confidentiality—would have reflected a concern
for the fairness of the bargain between pharmacies and physicians. The
Court in Sorrell suggested that such a law would have
been constitutional. 127
Thus, Sorrell and Brown, as evaluated under the lens of the fairbargain conception of First Amendment law, tend to show that
commoditized speech regulations that do something other than
attempt to protect one of the parties to a transaction are subject to
intensive First Amendment scrutiny, even while fairness-promoting
regulations rarely receive scrutiny at all.

124. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Vartuli, 228 F.3d 94, 107–13 (2d
Cir. 2000).
125. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 554 (2011).
126. Id.
127. Id.
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D. Commoditized Speech in Transactional Relationships
Bargain fairness also prominently appears in cases involving the
regulation of ongoing transactional relationships. Those cases fall
outside the narrow ambit of commercial speech, because they do not
strictly involve advertising or proposals to engage in a market
transaction. Rather, they involve a relationship of relative trust
between market participants. For example, in the securities realm, First
Amendment cases would involve the requirement that companies
make continuously available to market participants truthful, nonmisleading information about their operations and performance.128 In
the professional services realm, regulations require that advisors,
counselors, attorneys, and doctors provide information, advice, and
guidance that comply with certain minimal standards of professional
and ethical conduct. 129
The Supreme Court has permitted substantial content-based
regulation in those transactional settings to combat fraud and, more
broadly, to combat a lack of adequate bargain-relevant information for
consumers. 130 Each of those concerns is manifestly about bargain
128. The “core mechanism” of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is “sweeping
disclosure requirements” that allow “shareholder choice.” Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472
U.S. 1, 12 (1985); see also Longman v. Food Lion, Inc., 197 F.3d 675, 682 (4th Cir.
1999); Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 1987). But there have been
very few First Amendment challenges to those disclosure requirements. In Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Association, the Court stated in dictum that “[n]umerous examples could be cited of
communications that are regulated without offending the First Amendment,” including “the
exchange of information about securities [and] corporate proxy statements.” 436 U.S. 447, 456
(1978) (citations omitted). The Court noted that “[e]ach of these examples illustrates that the
State does not lose its power to regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the public
whenever speech is a component of that activity.” Id.
In the distant past, at least one federal appellate court summarily rejected a challenge to
the constitutionality of the regulation of corporate proxy materials. See SEC v. May, 229 F.2d
123, 124 (2d Cir. 1956) (holding that petitioners’ claims that proxy regulations “are
unconstitutional as unauthorized delegations of legislative power and otherwise . . . have no
merit” (emphasis added)).
129. See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1183, 1205–09 & nn.105–07 (2016) (explaining fiduciary duties of doctors, lawyers,
and accountants).
130. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (“When a State
regulates commercial messages to protect consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive
sales practices, or requires the disclosure of beneficial consumer information, the purpose of its
regulation is consistent with the reasons for according constitutional protection to commercial
speech and therefore justifies less than strict review. However, when a State entirely prohibits the
dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the
preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous
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equity. Further, regulation in these circumstances is content-based in
the most classic sense: it distinguishes between speech on the basis of
its content and between speakers on the basis of their identities. 131 The
Court makes such distinctions because the risk of fraud is greater in
some commercial contexts than others. 132
For example, most compelled commercial disclosures are subject
to reduced First Amendment scrutiny and are now subject to a
standard of review bordering on rational basis. 133 In settings where the
underlying transactions are complex or individuals stand in a
relationship of vulnerability to professionals with specialized
knowledge, the scope of permissible antifraud and information
disclosure measures has been even more sweeping. 134 The government
has been permitted to impose much more substantial antifraud and
information-forcing regulations on individuals who work as securities
professionals, accountants, and lawyers, for example, than almost
anyone else. 135

review that the First Amendment generally demands.”); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985) (“The States and the Federal Government are free to
prevent the dissemination of commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or misleading.”); Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980)
(“[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do
not accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The government may ban forms of
communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it.”).
131. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) (defining contentbased laws as “those that target speech based on its communicative content” by, for example,
“defining regulated speech by particular subject matter” or “its function or purpose”).
132. For example, the regulations will only apply to lawyers, accountants, or investment
advisers. Or, they will relate to certain types of information or classes of transaction, such as
selling a security, purchasing a house, or hiring an attorney. See also Schauer, supra note 2, at
1778 (“It might be hyperbole to describe the Securities and Exchange Commission as the
Content Regulation Commission, but such a description would not be wholly inaccurate.”).
133. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 657–58; Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc);
Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012); Borgner v.
Brooks, 284 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2002); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294 (1st
Cir. 2005); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2001).
134. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., SEC v. Lowe: Professional Regulation and the First
Amendment, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 93, 95; see also Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE
L.J. 1238, 1258–64 (2016) (describing doctrine).
135. Aleta G. Estreicher, Securities Regulation and the First Amendment, 24 GA. L. REV.
223, 223 (1990); Neuborne, supra note 25, at 5–6; see Schauer, supra note 2, at 1766–67,
1778, 1781–84. See generally Henry N. Butler, The First Amendment and Federal Securities
Regulation, 20 CONN. L. REV. 261 (1988).
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What restrictions on misleading speech and disclosure
requirements have in common is that they are intensely concerned
with regulating the four corners of the bargain. Each dictates the
information that must be made available to consumers before
bargaining even begins. And in the particular settings in which such
regulations are most pervasive—professional settings involving
complex transactions or circumstances involving the need for secretkeeping—the products themselves are almost always commoditized
speech. 136 They are frequently contracts with doctors, lawyers,
bankers, or accountants, for example, in which an individual is either
seeking access to specialized information or revealing information of
a particularly personal and sensitive kind. 137
Commentators have been puzzled for decades by the fact that
some areas of intensely content-based speech regulation remain
subject to, at best, modest First Amendment scrutiny. 138 But a judicial
concern for ensuring bargain fairness readily explains the lack of rigor.
The purpose of the measures in question is to level the bargaining
positions of the parties, thereby helping individuals to obtain a better
deal in circumstances of significant information asymmetry.
Regulations intended to prevent fraud are particularly suitable for
deference because they are often what make the transaction possible
at all by reducing the transaction costs associated with the imbalance
of power between the parties. If bargain fairness is the value guiding
the Courts’ decisions, it comes as no surprise that the Court has long
held that common-law antifraud regulation is completely exempt from
First Amendment scrutiny. 139
The Article’s thesis is also consistent with the tight nexus with
bargains that the Court has treated as essential to the deference a law
receives. Regulations that wander too far from immediate relevance to

136. See, e.g., Aman, supra note 134, at 94 (“[A] significant component of the ultimate
product or commodity produced and sold by many professions is in the form of words—spoken
or written.”).
137. See, e.g., Haupt, supra note 134, at 1248–54 (explaining that professionals “serve[]
as the conduit between . . . knowledge communities” and individuals).
138. See sources cited supra note 135.
139. “Where false claims are made to effect a fraud or secure moneys or other valuable
considerations, say offers of employment, it is well established that the Government may restrict
speech without affronting the First Amendment.” United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537,
2547 (2012); See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (noting that fraudulent speech generally falls outside the protections
of the First Amendment).
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an underlying transaction raise red flags. 140 The Court has explicitly
acknowledged that the First Amendment does not prevent antifraud
regulations, for example, but that it does prevent laws against lying
that have no commercial nexus. 141 It has also held that information
furnished by a credit reporting agency to a limited audience meant to
aid its subscribers in making business decisions is far less worthy of
First Amendment protection than speech that concerns a “public
issue” that was not made “solely in the individual interest of the
speaker and its specific business audience.” 142
The courts’ commercial speech, securities regulation, and
professional regulation cases all converge on bargain fairness. Where
the Court believes that a bargain between a consumer and a firm
would be made materially fairer by the imposition of a particular
speech regulation the Court generally defers. Where such regulations
do not have a close nexus with the bargain or are for other purposes,
however, they are likely to be subjected to heightened scrutiny.
E. Speech Restrictions Imposed by Monopolists
Cases involving monopolies comprise the area where the Court
has applied something like the bargain fairness conception with the
greatest consistency. This is logical because conditions of market
power are the easiest to evaluate from a bargain fairness perspective.
In Marsh v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that a company
town could not deprive town residents of the right to receive religious
literature from proselytizers. 143 Marsh could be reframed, however, as
a case about the permissible scope of the government’s power to
regulate the contractual relationship between the company and its
residents. Returning to the baseline assumption that individuals are
unlikely to concede, and companies are unlikely to make individuals
forgo First Amendment interests that are not within the scope of their
job duties, one could recast the case as a bargain fairness case. The fact
that the company town possessed monopoly power drove the Court
140. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 203–11 (1985) (interpreting the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 as not applying to financial newsletters in order to prevent potential First
Amendment problems).
141. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545–48.
142. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761–62 (1985).
143. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 503–04 (1946). Specifically, the case involved the
application of an Alabama trespassing statute to a Jehovah’s Witness, who attempted to distribute
religious literature on the privately owned sidewalks of a “company town.”
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to interpose a requirement in the contract between the company and
its residents that would likely have already been a part of the bargain
had the town not possessed monopoly power. 144
The Court has also permitted states to impose compulsory terms
in circumstances where the property owner has at least some market
power. 145 Thus, in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, the Supreme
Court concluded that a California Supreme Court decision requiring
that a shopping center permit high school students to exercise their
state-protected rights of expression and petition on its property did
not violate the shopping center’s First Amendment rights. 146 Because
a shopping center is often more than a site of commerce but also serves
as a focal point for conversation and community interaction, and
because such spaces can have considerable market power in small
communities, one justification for the result in Pruneyard is that it
enhances the bargaining power of those who use the shopping center
to see, hear, and partake in free expression.
The Court’s other market power decisions have involved
circumstances that might be described as analogous to preventing
firms from placing unfairly speech-restrictive terms in their contracts.
In Associated Press v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the
Associated Press’s (AP’s) system of By-Laws, which prevented all AP
member newspapers from selling news to non-member newspapers,
violated the antitrust laws. 147 The Court further held that newspapers
were not protected from antitrust scrutiny simply because the
products they sold were speech commodities. 148 In Lorrain Journal
Co. v. United States, the Court held that a requirement imposed by a
newspaper with monopoly power that its advertisers not advertise with
the local radio station similarly violated the antitrust laws and was

144. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 508–09 (“[T]he managers appointed by the corporation
cannot curtail the liberty of press and religion of these people consistently with the purposes of
the Constitutional guarantees . . . . Many people in the United States live in company-owned
towns. These people, just as residents of municipalities, are free citizens of their State and
country. . . . There is no more reason for depriving these people of the liberties guaranteed by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments than there is for curtailing these freedoms with respect
to any other citizen.”).
145. The Supreme Court has been hesitant to extend the Marsh doctrine, likely because of
its concern with protecting the welfare-enhancing power of individuals to freely enter into
contracts involving restrictions on speech.
146. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 76–77, 88 (1980).
147. 326 U.S. 1, 4 (1945).
148. Id. at 4–5, 7.

150

117

Commoditized Speech

ineligible for First Amendment protection. 149 In Turner Broadcasting
Systems, Inc. v. FCC, the Supreme Court upheld a federal law that
required cable television systems to dedicate some of their channels to
local broadcast television stations because cable providers had
monopoly power and local televisions stations were likely to go out of
business without the intercession of the law. 150
Framed in fair bargain terms, each of these cases involved a
situation where the court permitted the regulation of commoditized
speech on the explicit grounds that one of the parties possessed too
little power to obtain favorable terms. 151
F. Speech Restrictions in Employment Contexts
Workplace speech regulation is extensive and also puzzling. It has
proven to be an endless font of debate among scholars. Beginning
with labor law more than half a century ago and moving into modern
workplace harassment law, the Court has permitted the government
to place significant content-based restrictions on speech in the
workplace untroubled by the First Amendment. 152 Bargain fairness
explains why. In labor law and modern sexual harassment law, to give
two examples, the Court permits extensive regulation as part of its
broader view that regulation of the fairness of economic bargains
between the parties is permissible.
1. Labor law
In labor law, courts have permitted the extensive regulation of the
speech of employers and unions without applying serious First
Amendment scrutiny. Labor cases have permitted content-based
injunctions against picketing, 153 and treated even true statements
about the consequences of unionization as threats constituting an
149. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 152–53 (1951).
150. 520 U.S. 180, 185–86, 197–200 (1997).
151. And when the cases were close, such as in Turner, it was not because members of the
court objected to bargain fairness, but rather because they thought bargain fairness was being
used as a pretext for other aims. See id. at 229–30, 249 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
152. Fallon, supra note 36, at 1 (explaining absence of First Amendment scrutiny for
workplace sexual harassment laws); Schauer, supra note 2, at 1782 (absence of First Amendment
scrutiny for labor laws).
153. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 285–87, 295
(1957) (upholding an injunction against picketing); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336
U.S. 490, 491–92, 504 (1949) (same).
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unfair labor practice. 154 As Schauer explained, “much of the balance of
modern labor law involves unashamedly content-based restrictions on
boycotts, strikes, and picketing.” 155 The result is that “[i]n some
contexts unions may say and do things that employers may not, and
in other contexts employers may say and do things that unions may
not—the two schemes together constituting a complex but contentbased system of government regulation of speech.” 156
The reason for the Court’s relatively permissive First Amendment
treatment of labor regulations, which seems clear from the cases
themselves, 157 is that unionization is a method of economic
empowerment for workers that the government may justifiably protect
through speech regulation. At the same time, unions must be
restrained to ensure that they do not abuse their position of relative
market power to extract unfair concessions from employers. 158 One
might reasonably argue from a laissez-faire free marketeer’s
perspective that labor law, with its regulatory tinkering and countertinkering, represents concern for bargain fairness run amok, resulting
in substantial restrictions on valuable speech. What has likely driven
the Court’s refusal to interfere is a belief that the government’s
purpose in regulating the labor sphere is both benign and permissible,
designed to ensure that employers and unions strike fair bargains even
if the consequence is significant content-based restrictions on the
speech of employers and unions.

154. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 616–20 (1969); Farris Fashions, Inc. v.
NLRB, 32 F.3d 373, 376 (8th Cir. 1994).
155. Schauer, supra note 2, at 1783.
156. Id.
157. See infra note 158.
158. See, e.g., Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 617 (“And any balancing of those rights must
take into account the economic dependence of the employees on their employers, and the
necessary tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick up intended implications
of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear.”); Local 695, 354
U.S. at 285–87, 295 (“The Court therefore concluded that it was ‘clear that appellants were
doing more than exercising a right of free speech or press. . . . They were exercising their
economic power together with that of their allies to compel Empire to abide by union rather
than by state regulation of trade.’”); Giboney, 336 U.S. at 497 (“To exalt all labor union conduct
in restraint of trade above all state control would greatly reduce the traditional powers of states
over their domestic economy and might conceivably make it impossible for them to enforce their
antitrade restraint laws.”).
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2. Workplace sexual harassment
Bargain fairness also explains one of the great riddles of modern
First Amendment law: the complete absence of First Amendment
scrutiny for workplace sexual harassment regulations. In the area of
workplace harassment law, courts have not applied First Amendment
scrutiny, 159 even though workplace harassment is almost always a
product of speech in the workplace. 160 The fact that workplace
harassment law restricts a great deal of speech on the basis of its
content has been a source of great scholarly concern, 161 but has not
gained similar traction in the courts. 162
Jack Balkin gave one of the best explanations for the courts’
decision not to subject harassment in the workplace to First
Amendment scrutiny: that employees at work are functionally a
captive audience. 163 As Balkin once explained, the “employee working
for low wages in a tight job market who is sexually harassed by her
employer or co-worker” is in many ways analogous to the “passengers
on the public buses who may see advertisements they would rather

159. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful “to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(a)(1) (2000).
160. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Speech-ing of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 347, 352 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004)
(“[A] survey of the kinds of events that generate hostile environment claims demonstrates that
in most of them the hostile environment is created by an environment of insults, jokes, catcalls,
comments, and other forms of undeniably verbal conduct.”); Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of
Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687,
691 (1997); Volokh, supra note 50, at 1800–01.
161. See Estlund, supra note 160, at 707 (“The range of [scholarly] views on this matter
spans the full gamut, from those who would permit the regulation of any speech that contributes
to a hostile environment, including speech on public issues, to those who would permit no
regulation of speech that would be protected in the public square.”); Mary Anne Franks, Sexual
Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655, 697–99 (2012) (summarizing disputes); see also Mary
Becker, How Free Is Speech at Work?, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 815 (1996); Eugene Volokh, How
Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 563 (1995).
162. See Fallon, supra note 36, at 1 (summarizing Supreme Court’s quiet rejection of First
Amendment claims in the landmark Title VII case Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17
(1993)); see also Estlund, supra note 160, at 707 (“The Supreme Court has left few clues to the
constitutionally permissible scope of workplace harassment law, and the lower courts have largely
followed the Harris model of silence.”).
163. See J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295,
2312–14 (1999).
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avoid or the child running through stations on the radio dial.” 164
However, captive audience doctrine is murky, normatively
controversial, and difficult to apply. 165 As Balkin himself has
acknowledged, whether an individual is viewed as a captive audience
member depends on contingent societal views about what constitutes
unjust coercion. 166
Despite its shortcomings, Balkin’s captive audience argument
provides a compelling account of the absence of First Amendment
scrutiny for workplace sexual harassment. It also neatly matches up
with the theory of bargain fairness. Reconceiving harassment law in
bargain terms, the prohibition on harassment in the workplace might
be considered a compulsory term meant to reflect an anti-sexualharassment term that employees would obtain in a fair bargain. Due
to its disfavored status in society, harassing speech has relatively low
value, and permitting harassing speech is rarely germane to the
requirements of a job. Consequently, if employees and employers were
to bargain on equal footing over the issue, it is not implausible that
employers would be willing to accede to an employee’s demand that
the employee not be subjected to harassment in the workplace.
Moreover, an important and underappreciated component of
workplace sexual harassment law is that people cannot prospectively
waive their rights to be free from harassment in their employment
contracts. 167 The discrimination laws are not mere contractual default
rules, but rather mandatory non-waivable guarantees made to every
employee. 168 Two possible justifications are that (1) it is probably
difficult to price such waivers, because it is difficult to know how many
employees would freely and voluntarily submit to sexual harassment,
and (2) it is more administrable and transaction cost-effective to apply
an across-the-board presumption against waiver to all employment
contracts. Because it is unlikely that any person would like to be
164. J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 424.
165. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 160, at 715–18.
166. See Balkin, supra note 163, at 2314; Balkin, supra note 164, at 423–24.
167. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 (1974) (explaining that an
employee cannot prospectively waive her Title VII rights); Cange v. Stotler & Co., 826 F.2d
581, 594 & n.11 (7th Cir. 1987); Rogers v. Gen. Elec. Co., 781 F.2d 452, 454 (5th Cir. 1986)
(“While a release of Title VII claims will not ordinarily violate public policy, an employee may
validly release only those Title VII claims arising from ‘discriminatory acts or practices which
antedate the execution of the release.’”); EEOC, EEOC NOTICE NO. 915.002 (Apr. 10, 1997).
168. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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sexually harassed, prohibiting sexual harassment likely safeguards the
vast majority of workers from the possibility that their employer might
attempt to sneak a waiver provision into their employment contract.
The fact that rights to freedom from sexual harassment may not
be waived, moreover, shows that the power of the government to
regulate commoditized speech is greater than ordinarily assumed. The
non-waivability of rights against sexual harassment is similar to the
non-waivability of rights against malpractice and fraud. 169 Even though
fraud and malpractice liability are unwaivable, the Court has not struck
down those forms of liability as violative of the First Amendment even
when they result in significant censorship. Thus, contrary to the
assumptions of scholars like Volokh, Solove, and Richards, 170 the
Court has permitted legislatures to determine that some types of
waivers are so likely to result in unfair bargains that they may be
prohibited entirely.
G. The Contested Field of Tort-Like Harms from Commoditized Speech
The final field of commoditized speech cases worth canvassing is
that mysterious region where First Amendment scrutiny has been
highly unpredictable: tort liability for harms arising from
commoditized speech. The argument from a fair-bargain standpoint
is that these cases prove difficult because it is unclear which party to
the bargain is treated unfairly by the imposition of liability. On the one
hand, failing to impose liability means that tortious harms fall on
victims. On the other hand, in many of these circumstances, it seems
169. See, e.g., Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 390 (5th
Cir. 2010) (noting that liability for securities fraud is unwaivable under federal and Texas law
securities laws); Adam Candeub, Contract, Warranty, and the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 45, 58 (2011) (nothing that medical malpractice liability is
unwaivable); Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age of Mandatory and
Professional Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REV. 449, 468 (2004) (noting that “public policy
considerations and codes of professional conduct generally preclude members of [certain
professions] from attempting to limit their liability for their professional negligence”); see also
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (2003) (“All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly,
to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or
property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of
the law.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(h)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (stating
that a lawyer shall not “make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer’s liability to a client
for malpractice unless the client is independently represented in making this agreement”).
170. See Solove & Richards, supra note 23, at 1655 (arguing that government may not
constitutionally impose unwaivable speech-restrictive civil liability rules); Volokh, supra note 45,
at 1057 (similar).
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unlikely that the product would be economical to provide if tort
liability were available. Moreover, in many cases, it is extremely costly
to adjudicate tort claims due to concerns about the traceability of the
harms to the speech commodity.
In fields where these concerns do not exist, liability for
commoditized speech is routine and unproblematic. Malpractice is a
familiar tort that has never been a focus of First Amendment attention.
Similarly, cases involving technical products that have a defined
discrete group of customers who use the product solely for its
informational value also routinely escape First Amendment scrutiny.
In Brocklesby v. United States, for example, the Ninth Circuit held that
a publisher of a factually erroneous aeronautical chart could be held
liable for furnishing a defective product. 171 There are similar cases
finding liability and a lack of First Amendment protection for other
speech products providing misleading instructions. 172
However, courts have interposed the First Amendment to block
tort liability in cases in which traceability is difficult to establish and
the likely uses for commoditized speech are many and varied. In
Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, the Ninth Circuit held that mushroom
enthusiasts who became severely ill from picking and eating
mushrooms after relying on faulty information in The Encyclopedia of
Mushrooms could not recover tort damages because the First
Amendment protected the publisher from negligence and products
liability. 173 Courts have also dismissed on First Amendment grounds
tort cases brought on theories that speech inspired or influenced
another to engage in tortious conduct. 174

171. 767 F.2d 1288, 1295 n.9, 1296 (9th Cir. 1985).
172. See, e.g. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d 339, 342–43 (9th Cir.
1980); McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 504 (Fla. 1992) (discussing liability for
providing a map that incorrectly indicated the location of an electric cable); Rozny v. Marnul,
250 N.E.2d 656, 658–59 (Ill. 1969) (discussing liability for providing a defective survey map).
173. 938 F.2d 1033, 1033–34 (9th Cir. 1991).
174. See Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that a
magazine article on autoerotic asphyxia was entitled to First Amendment protection from
liability because it did not “incite” adolescent’s death); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr.
187 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that musical compositions expressing the view that suicide is an
acceptable alternative to life were protected by the First Amendment from suit for wrongful
death); Olivia N. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Ct. App. 1981) (dismissing on First
Amendment grounds a suit based on a sexual assault patterned on a similar assault portrayed in
a television show).
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Volokh has opined that liability in the aeronautical charts cases
might be predicated on the immediacy of the need for the information
provided. 175 He has explained that:
People use aeronautical charts not by considering whether to follow
the charts’ advice, contemplating using a different chart, or deciding
which of the charts’ many recommendations should be accepted.
Chart users just apply the information given in the charts. Charts are
authoritative, especially in an environment where quick decisions are
necessary and lives are at stake. 176

That conclusion is somewhat plausible, though ultimately difficult
to fit neatly with the outcomes of the cases. For example, some
purchasers of a mushroom encyclopedia presumably purchase it with
the specific intention of using it to sort safe mushrooms from deadly
ones. Moreover, there have been cases in which courts have held that
the First Amendment does not protect even highly speech-like (as
opposed to product-like) speech. For example, the Fourth Circuit
held that the First Amendment did not shield a publisher of the book
Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors from tort
liability for causing several individuals’ deaths when a reader used the
manual to carry out a murder for hire. 177
Bargain fairness intersects with this area of law by positing that
courts have difficulty with these cases because it is hard to determine
which rule promotes bargain fairness. In the faulty technical
instructions cases, the analysis is relatively easy. Individuals who
purchased those products almost certainly would have demanded a
warranty for the specific use to which they put the product if they had
sufficient bargaining power. The cases become more difficult as the
uses of a product become more variegated and the likelihood that
every person in a broad class of consumers would demand the same
contractual guarantee diminishes. Because not every purchaser of The
Encyclopedia of Mushrooms purchases it for the purpose of using it as a
guidebook for selecting safe wild mushrooms, it is not nearly as clear
that such a warranty term is reasonable to impose.

175. Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, First Amendment Protection for Search Engine
Search Results, 23 COMPETITION: J. ANTI. & UNFAIR COMP. L. SEC. ST. B. CAL. 112,
119 (2014).
176. Id.
177. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 241–43 (4th Cir. 1997), rev’g 940 F.
Supp. 836 (D. Md. 1996).
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It is worth noting that in the tort injury cases, courts are effectively
using the background principles of tort law to override the equivalent
of default warranty terms derived from the First Amendment. 178 Given
the arc of the case law, and the uncertainty in determining what the
best rules of liability in such cases are, it is likely that if the legislature
were to specifically enact a law making certain tort duties applicable
to particular speech commodities in order to enhance bargain fairness,
courts would more readily defer to that judgment. One might imagine
that as long as a law reflected a reasonable decision about which rule
would enhance the fairness of the bargain between the parties, the law
would be upheld.
IV. THE NORMATIVE APPEAL OF THE “FAIR BARGAIN”
CONCEPTION
The most fascinating aspect of the “fair bargain” conception is its
apparently attenuated relationship with conventional First
Amendment values—protection for democratic deliberation, the
search for truth, individual autonomy, self-expression, tolerance,
dissent, etc. Behind this apparent dissonance, however, lies a perfectly
understandable logic. Namely, because speech is commodifiable at all,
it must be subject to at least some minimal market regulation. Placing
an order for a book and purchasing a ticket to a movie, for example,
could not be done without at least some generally applicable
commercial laws governing those transactions.
A. Bargain Fairness as a Solution to the Market Norm vs. Speech Norm
Dilemma
Once neutral generally applicable principles governing market
transactions are permitted—even occasionally—to restrain and restrict
speech, however, the Court faces a dilemma. It must determine when
to apply market norms to commoditized speech and when to apply
speech norms. This question is especially difficult because many
familiar neutral generally applicable principles governing market
transactions specifically look to the nature of the commodity to
determine the nature of the applicable rules. Determining whether a
particular type of property is inalienable, for example, depends on

178. This would be an analogy to the idea that firms cannot waive personal injury liability
in contracts of adhesion. See William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 791–96 (1966).
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looking at the character of the property. Determining whether a
product must be sold with a warning label requires an inquiry into the
dangerousness of the product. Determining whether merchant rules
should govern a transaction requires recourse to the identity of the
parties to the transaction. Put simply, many typical market regulations
are simultaneously “neutral” and “general,” and yet are “content” and
“speaker-based” when applied to speech commodities because their
application turns on the nature of the product and the parties to
the transaction.
Bargain fairness regulation is an accurate characterization of the
rationale behind the Court’s determinations of which types of
commoditized speech regulations are market regulations rather than
speech regulations. By permitting regulations directed at the fairness of
the bargain, the Court permits legislatures to engage in the types of
regulations most common to typical market regulation.
The Court was not compelled to draw the line at the fair bargain
juncture. It could have treated all regulations of commoditized speech
as speech regulations. Alternatively, it could have treated all
regulations of commoditized speech as market regulations. Or it could
have followed an eclectic path between the two. Instead, however, it
appears that fair bargains are where the Court drew the line, and that
decision is defensible.
Before defending the fair bargain conception, it is worth pointing
out the drawbacks that would have come from drawing a different
line. If the Court had treated all commoditized speech regulation as
subject to significant First Amendment scrutiny, the harms to social
welfare would have been significant. For example, it is unclear how
the Court could justify occupational licensing, lawsuits for legal
malpractice, or the enforcement of most copyright law if
commoditized speech regulations were subject to conventional First
Amendment scrutiny. Similarly, if the Court had chosen to treat all
regulation of commoditized speech as typical market regulation, it
would be trivially easy for the government to engage in censorship
through the vehicle of market regulation. The Government could
restrict access to speech commodities for the same fanciful reasons it
sometimes imposes regulations on traditional commodities, heedlessly
censoring much speech at the core of the First Amendment.
The Court might have chosen an eclectic approach—striking
down some regulations and upholding others based on a balancing of
interests—but
familiar
problems
with
incommensurability
immediately would have arisen. An eclectic approach to analyzing the
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First Amendment stakes of securities regulation, labor speech
regulation, or workplace harassment would have required the Court
to draw unpleasant lines. An eclectic approach would have required
the Court to somehow balance society’s interest in economic welfare
with an individual’s interest in freedom of expression case by case.
Moreover, it would have required the court to justify the choice of
balancing itself. Thus, an eclectic approach would have required the
Court to explain how imposing categorical (or default) rules
prohibiting certain kinds of speech would unduly harm freedom
of expression.
Bargain fairness sidesteps the balancing problems with the eclectic
approach by eliminating the question of First Amendment values from
the analysis at the outset. The proper question under fair bargain
analysis is not whether the economic benefits from the regulation
outweigh the First Amendment harms it imposes, but whether the
regulation results in an economic benefit to the less powerful of the
two parties to the bargain. Bargain fairness posits that any First
Amendment harms are ameliorated by the fact that the two parties
would willingly enter into the contract in any event and the only
question is whether a term the less powerful party prefers will control.
B. Other Benefits of Bargain Fairness
Bargain fairness has at least three other virtues. First, the type of
“balancing” analysis that it calls for involves a comparison of costs and
benefits, and so does not require juggling incommensurables. Second,
it places reasonably clear, identifiable limits on the boundaries of
permissible government regulations of commoditized speech. Third,
and most importantly, it poses little risk of spillover censorship.
First, consider balancing. Balancing as a method of performing
legal analysis has long been criticized because it is regarded as
indeterminate and, even when honestly performed, beset by
incommensurability problems. 179 Balancing in the fair bargain context
is not indeterminate, however, and does not involve
incommensurables. Instead, balancing in the fair bargain context
requires courts to determine the value of the speech being negotiated
from the perspective of both parties to the bargain, and from that
estimate, determine whether the regulation is designed to make the
bargain materially fairer. Determining the value of the right to each
179. Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779,
841 (1994).
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party will involve judgment; so will determining whether the
discrepancy between the value to the parties is too great to sustain.
However, those types of judgments, which involve judgments of
degree rather than comparisons of kind, are not susceptible to the
same critiques as conventional balancing analysis.
Second, consider clarity and predictability. Vindicating only those
government regulations that approximate fair bargains sets clear
identifiable limits on the permissible scope of government power to
interfere with transactions involving commoditized speech. First, and
most basically, fair bargain analysis is limited to circumstances in which
there is a transactional relationship. Unless the government seeks to
regulate an interaction between parties who seek to undertake a
consensual commercial transaction, the government is subject to the
fully panoply of First Amendment limits on its power to act. Second,
transactional terms that do not reasonably approximate a fair bargain
are unlawful. That limitation greatly circumscribes the kinds of
substantive and procedural alterations the government may make to
otherwise consensual transactions in which parties seek to alienate
some aspect of their First Amendment rights.
Third, consider the risk of spillover censorship. Regulation of the
parties’ bilateral bargaining positions in the market is the least
dangerous form of market regulation—it only imposes substantive
values on the parties to the degree those values already reflect their
preferences. Such regulations are designed to reflect the hypothetical
interests of one of the parties, and not of the government. In the
language of Solove and Richards, the government’s regulations are
not thought to be problematic because they merely “backstop”
private ordering. 180
C. Potential Limitations of the Bargain Fairness Model
To be sure, bargain fairness, like all methods of deciding difficult
and important legal questions, has drawbacks. Most prominently, it
can be contended that “fairness” is a vague and manipulable concept.
It could also be argued that the test permits the government to
gradually eliminate disfavored speech from the marketplace. Finally,
one might take the absolutist position that permitting speech to be
extensively regulated anywhere places its protection at risk

180. Solove & Richards, supra note 23, at 1655.
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everywhere. Nonetheless, each of those objections can be answered,
even if not all of them can be entirely overcome.
First, consider the supposed vagueness of “fairness.” Fairness and
equity are vague concepts, so one might object that bargain fairness as
a concept is so imprecise and malleable as to be meaningless. One
might argue that what seems like a fair trade to one man seems like
theft to another. That objection has some heft, though it ultimately
misses the idea that “fairness” in this context is reasonably objective
and definite. Courts are not balancing incommensurables, rather, they
are approximating the value of the right to the speaker who is giving
up her right to speak, and its value to her counterparty, who is
receiving that promise. It is not difficult in most cases to determine
when a law has been enacted to benefit one of the parties to a
transaction and when, instead, it has been enacted for other purposes.
Difficult cases can and do arise where legislatures pretend to enact
laws that benefit one of the parties, when in fact neither party would
favor the law in question. The objection in that situation, however,
turns from a general objection to whether fairness can be applied in
principle to a specific objection to its application in particular cases.
Courts, however, engage in that sort of analysis routinely—they are
often called upon to determine whether laws have a purpose or effect
other than the one they purport to have. Thus, while the concept of a
“fair bargain” may be vague and difficult to define, it is not an empty
concept. As this Article has endeavored to show, the Court already
applies it.
Second, consider the incremental censorship objection. The fair
bargain concept suffers from a slight circularity problem. When the
government changes the circumstances of a particular contract or set
of contracts through regulation, the relative value of the speech
alienated in those relationships changes to reflect that change in
baseline. To give one example, the imposition of privacy regulations
in one sphere may make it appear unfair that such protective
regulations have not been imposed in another sphere as well. As social
conditions change due to regulations on commoditized speech, it may
be that the existence of one set of regulations justifies the imposition
of more regulations. One might argue that this result occurred in
labor law, where enhancing the power of unions by restricting
employer speech ultimately required some restrictions on union
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speech to restore the balance. 181 In that sense, the circularity problem
might also be thought of as a kind of slippery-slope problem—as soon
as commoditized speech is regulated, it will be difficult to draw lines
against additional regulation.
The circularity or slippery-slope issue is a real one. Terms that
seem fair against one baseline can come to seem unfair as the baseline
moves. The result could eventually be that an area that was once
entirely free from government regulation could come to be almost
totally coopted by government regulation as each small regulatory
change comes to justify the next incremental change. When laws are
reviewed on the basis of present expectations, or present market value,
they risk this form of regulatory creep. Nonetheless, the circularity
issue might be overblown. Social expectations exist in a constant state
of flux, and there is not necessarily any objectively appropriate level of
legal regulation in any particular area at any particular time. Presentist
tests, like the bargain fairness test, have the virtue of vindicating
contemporary values without upsetting settled social expectations by
attempting to restore outdated norms. In that sense, circularity can be
as much a virtue as a vice.
Third, consider the absolutist objection: permitting the extensive
regulation of speech anywhere places it at risk everywhere. One might
argue that permitting speech regulation on the basis of bargain fairness
poses a grave danger that courts will overlook the important
substantive stakes of permitting content-based regulation. Speech is
not just property. Who may speak and what they may say has a
profound impact on every aspect of society—from who is elected to
political office to what values society decides are worth pursuing.
When courts permit the government to restrict or regulate speech on
the basis of its commercial or propertarian properties, they risk losing
sight of the fact that it possesses the dual aspect of informing and
influencing the rest of society.
There are two replies to that critique. The first is that that
argument can be leveled against any restriction or restraint on speech,
not just restrictions justified on fair bargain grounds. The central
problem society confronts in determining how to implement the First
Amendment is recognizing that speech always has a multifarious

181. See Schauer, supra note 2, at 1783 (“In some contexts unions may say and do things
that employers may not, and in other contexts employers may say and do things that unions may
not—the two schemes together constituting a complex but content-based system of government
regulation of speech.”).
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character. Even the most valuable speech might, by virtue of its form
or content, be justifiably suppressed. The second reply is that speech
is not the only form of property that has a dual nature. Physical
property has significant expressive importance and plays an essential
role in structuring society, but the government has a free hand to
regulate it. Given that property regulation has done a decent job
respecting the multifaceted nature of property, it is at least possible to
argue that speech regulation justified on commercial grounds can
nonetheless respect the multifaceted nature of speech. Ultimately the
benefit of permitting bargain fairness regulation—its tendency to
advance social welfare—may far outweigh its incidental effects
on speech.
CONCLUSION
This Article sought to develop a theory of the appropriate role of
the First Amendment in governing the regulation of commoditized
speech, namely, that courts should apply a “bargain fairness” model
when reviewing such regulations. Speech regulations that merely
enhance the bargaining power of one of the parties to a transaction
should be upheld, while regulations that have other purposes and
effects should be struck down. The Court’s cases involving the
regulation of commoditized speech are well-explained by that
implicit concern.
If the Court were to openly embrace fair bargain analysis, it might
improve its application in two ways. First, the Court might take
advantage of available comparators to better determine the value of
the speech at stake. For example, where an industry has adopted an
industry standard practice, the government could intervene to make
that standard practice compulsory, thereby protecting consumers from
firms that deviate from the industry norm. Courts could also look to
other industries or nations to determine how consumer expectations
interact with certain kinds of industry regulation. The resulting
increase in judicial accuracy could help courts distinguish between
genuine bargain-fairness-enhancing laws and those that seek to use
bargain fairness as a pretext for substantive censorship. A second way
the Court could improve its analysis might be to consider economic
evidence to determine whether regulations are appropriate. For
example, it could look at survey evidence, or natural experiments, to
determine whether less powerful parties (like consumers and
employees) truly would like to see certain regulations enacted. Again,
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such analysis could help to prevent the misuse of bargain fairness as a
covert means of impermissible censorship.
The government’s power to regulate commoditized speech is
broad, but carefully circumscribed. As a normative matter, the Court
has taken a defensible position in carving out a space for laws that
enhance bargain fairness, straddling the uneasy line between
appropriate concern for social welfare and the preservation of
important First Amendment values.
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